The purpose of this paper is to make up for lacks of the past researches with respect to basic search models with continuous effort. We suppose a discrete search space composed of n boxes and an exponential·type detection function in each box. First an explicit solution is derived for a detection search game. Secondly we consider an information search problem and propose a sequential method of constructing the optimal policy. Thirdly we consider a certainty search game in which the payoff function is given by the posterior uncertainty with respect to the position of player I (hider) and obtain the solution in the form of a solution of a certain simultaneous equations. Finally we consider a whereabouts search model and derive the same result as the discrete effort case.
Introduction
The research area of the search theo:ry is divided broadly into two : One is the one-sided search model in which decision is made only by the searcher, and another is the two-sided model in which decisions are made by both the searcher and the object (or hider). For example, a search model for a stationary object or a target moving according to a given rule is the former case and the case that the object can evade (or hide) of his own free will is the latter. Mathematical treatments of models are different as the search effort is discrete or continuous. If the search effort is discrete, most of one-sided search models can be formulated by non-linear programming or dynamic programming, on the other hand, if the search effort is continuous, they become variational problems. For the two-sided search model, the game theory is generally used. Moreover various cri"teria for decision making have been considered in each case, that is, (i) Maximizing the detection probability under a given search effort (the detection search problem).
(ji) Minimizing the expected search effort until detection of the object.
(in) Maximizing the expected amount of information about the location of the object obtained by allocating a given search effort (the information search problem).
(iv) Maximizing the probability of collectly guessing the whereabouts of the object after allocating a given search effort (the whereabouts search problem) •
Usually it is assumed t.hat the objective of the search is detection of object and therefore criteria (i) and (ii) are used broadly. But other possible objectives can be obtianed by considering the contemplated post-search action.
For example, in a reconnaissance problem the main duty of a scout is not to discover but to locate the enemy correctly. Therefore his true objective is to maximize the expected information gain about the position of the enemy or the probability of correct guess for its position. In such a case the criterion (iii) or (iv) is used. For example, Danskin [4] used the expected information gain as a measure of the effectiveness of a reconnaissance scheme. By simple examples, Mela [10] and Pollock [11] show that the optimal policies for detection search, information search and wh~reabouts search need not coincide with each other. Since each optimal policy is based on a different criterion, it cannot be considered that one is an improvement for another. The above examples seem to show that the connection between information theory and search theory is at best tenuous. Nevertheless in the case of an exponential detection function Barker [1] shows that the search that maximizes the probability of detection also maximizes the entropy of the posterior distribution of the object. The first paper concerning whereabouts search problem is Tognetti [17J. In the case of discrete search effort Kadane [9J shows that the optimal whereabouts search policy allQcates the given search effort according to the optimal detection search policy among all boxes except the box to be guessed at the end of an unsuccessful search. Stone and Kadane [16] treats a whereabouts search problem for a moving target.
Another well-known criterion is to minimize the expected risk, that is, the expected search cost minus the expected reward for detecting the object. In this case we need to consider the stop of search when the expected future reward is smaller than the expected search cost. The first paper which introduces this criterion and considers the problem of search and stop is Ross in box i and R. be a re- 
, it coincides the minimum cost (effort) criterion. In this sense, the risk criterion seems to be more complieated than the above-mentioned criteria.
Therefore we exclude the risk criterion from basic (simple) criteria. Considering the combination of decision, effort and criterion, various cases are possible whi,~h are classified in Table 1 . In each case of Table 1 the following basic search problem is considered: In the one-sided search model, we consider that the object is in one of the n boxes with the prior distribution P==<P1' ••• , Pn> and therefore the problem is formulated as a maximizing (or minimizing) problem with constraints. In the two-sided search model, we suppose that the object (or the hider) hides in one of the n boxes of his own free will and does not move during search periods by the searcher. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum two-person game. We assume that the conditional probability of detection is given, that is, in a discrete search effort case, the conditional detection probability S.(the probability that the object ~ is detected by one look in box i, given that it is in box i) is given, and in a continuous search effort case, the exponential detection function 1-exp(-A.
~ z)(the probability that the searcher detects the object by allocating search effort z into box i) is given where A. is a known positive constant. Furthermore in the cases of criteria (i), (iil) and (iv), the total search effort E is supposed to be given. [2] model IT::TI
Charnes and Cooper (3) Suberman (17) Blackwell (2) Dobbie (5) Sakaguchi (14), Roberts and Gittins (12) , Gittins and Roberts (7) Gittins (6) Sakaguchi (15) Kadane (9) . In this paper we intend to supplement lacks of the past researches. In Sec- 
Detection Search Game
Player I (hider) selects one of n boxes of his own free will, hides in it and never moves during the search by player 11. Player 11 (searcher) searches player I by dividing the given total continuous search effort E and allocating it in each box. For each box i the exponential detection function 1-exp (-A'Z) is given and known to both players (which is defined in the pre-
vious section). The strategies for player I and 11 can be represented by p=< P1"'" Pn> and x=(x 1 ,···, xn) respectively where Pi is the probability that player I hides in box i and x; is the amount of effort allocated in box i 
The game va.lue is v=exp(-
for all x, all p.
The left-si.de of the relation (2.3) is obvious because
To show the right-side of the relation (2.3), we consider the following concave programming:
The Kuhn-Tllcker theorem gives the necessary and sufficient condition for xO=(x~, ••• , x~) to be optimal as follows: For a Lagrangian multiplier u,
LA.
, there is such a box k that xk>O and hence by the relations (2.6) and(2.7), we obtain
Therefore by the relation (2.6), xO > ° for all i. Then by the relations i (2.6) and (2.7), and player II should search in such a manner that the conditional probability of no detection exp(-A.X.) becomes constant for all boxes. 
H(p) is a well-known entropy function used tu Shannon in communications work.
Dx(P)
is the probability of detecting the object by the policy x given that the prior distribution of the object is p. TxP is the posterior distribution of the position of the object given that the prior distribution is P and that it is not detected by the policy x. If the object is (is not) detected, then Proof: Because f(x) is convex by Lemma 1, the Kuhn-Tucker theorem gives * a necessary and sufficient condition for a policy x to be optimal, that is,
where U is a Lagrangian multiplier. The result (3.10) cna be derived directly 
If x. (E)=O, then box i is not searched at any time and hence it\'I(E) for all until now.
(ii) After an allocation ~ has been carried out, the additional minute effort 
Let us consider the meaning of the function Li[x]. Let p(x)=<P1(x), ••• , Pn
(x» be the posterior distribution of the object's location given that the allocation x fails to detect it, that is,
1. 1.
Certainty Search Game
Let us consider an information search game in which the payoff for the maximizing player I (hider) is given by the negative sign of the expected information gain Ix(p) in (3.1). In spite of the searcher's policy it is obviously optimal for the hider to hide in any box with probability one since 
Proof:: It is sufficient to show that
first we consider a maximizing problem
theorem gives the necessary and sufficient condition for p to be optimal, that is, Then there is a sequence {Ei}~=O such that (4.14) (O=::
; En (=::00) and the solution of the certainty search game is given as follows
aA~ , a,'" . a> 
k=1 k=1
The value of E~ Ris determined by ER-= l: xO k where k=1
are the solution of the simultaneous equations 
Therefore the game value is given by~.
by (4.19). (i) A box, which has higher conditional detection rate, has a larger possibility that player I hides and 11 searches in it.
(ii) The larger the total search effort is, the wider the range in which both players take actions becomes.
(iii) The optimal hiding-rate for player I is proportional to the inverse of the conditional detection rate in searched box and in constant in unsearched box.
Whereabouts Search Problem
A stationary object is in one of n boxes according to the prior distribution p = <P1'···' P n >· 1-exp(-A.Z) for each box.
~
We assume an· exponential detection function The searcher allocates the total effort E and if he detects the object, then he obtains payoff unit, on the other hand, if he fails to detect it, then he guesses the whereabouts of the object and if his guess is correct (incorrect), his payoff is unit (zero). The objective of the searcher is to determine optimally the allocation of the seaTch effort and the guessed box in order to maximize his expected payoff. The searcher's policy is given by (x ,i) where
) is an allocation of total search effort E and i denotes a box guessed after the failure of detection. The maximum expected payoff W(p) is given by
where Dx(p) and T~ are given by (3.3) and (3.4) respectively.
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We consider a relation between a detection search policy and a whereabout.s search policy. The expected payoff by a whereabouts search policy ( --x becomes a detection search problem. Hence the optimal allocation policy for the whereabouts search problem is the same as the optimal detection search policy (model ~in Table 1 ) for n-1 boxes except the guessed box. Thus we can obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 6. The optimal allocation of search effort is the same as the optimal detection search policy for all other boxes except the guessed box.
The guessed box can be obtained as follows:
Solve a detection search problems (5.]) for each box tute the results into (5.2) and find a box attaining i (=1, ... , n), substi-
m<~n< in (5.2).
=~=n Theorem 6 is similar to the well-known result (Kadane [9] ) in the case of discrete search effort.
Conclusion
Under the detection search criterion, this paper has resolved a unique remained problem, that is, a detection search game with continuous search effort. In Sections 3 and 4, the information search problem has been discussed in both a one-sided case and a two-sided case. Their solution have
been obtained in such a form that numerical problems can be solved with the help of a computer. Finally in the case of continuous search effort the fundamental theorem for the whereabouts search problem has been obtained.
In Table 1 , some basic search models are still unsolved. As a result of attacking the models, it seems that if an analytic and explicit solution for a one-sided model is not obtained, then it is difficult to solve the corresponding two-sided model (game). For a moving target, we can consider the same basic search models as in Table 1 . In fact, in recent fifteen years there has been a remarkable progress in the area of one-sided search models for a moving target. On the other hand, the two-sided search model becomes the evasion-search game jn which player I (evader) can move of his own free will among search, but there are few papers in this area.
